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innovation.1 Introduction
Softening the irreversible cost to enter a project via technology innovation can be an
issue for a ¯rm with the monopoly over the project. This is more so if the ¯rm faces
the prospect of a second irreversibility, namely the project's demise. Irreversible demise
amounts to the action of discarding the project for good when, given the status-quo level
of the irreversible cost, the project's Present Value (PV) deteriorates down to a su±cient
level of unattractiveness. This is the demise-adjusted problem considered by Ha-Duong
and Morel (2003), who study the real options e®ects of a lower absorbing barrier for the
project's PV. Softening the irreversible cost is a way to alleviate the value e®ects of an
approaching demise. Some of the current problems faced by the oil industry are conducive
evidence that technology innovation aimed at softening irreversible costs can restitute
glamour to projects that are on their way to a dead end. The non-OPEC oil ¯elds are
ageing and
... the blizzard of breakthroughs that reduced the cost of ¯nding and
developing oil has now slowed to a trickle. ... [T]he majors cut research
too much ... . Breakthroughs are clearly needed, though, if ¯rms are to ¯nd
oil economically in tricky places such as the Siberian tundra or the ultra-deep
waters o® Africa and Brazil1.
The question is: How much is a ¯rm willing to pay up front for having the chance
of accessing a cheaper investment technology before the project's demise? That is, how
1\Oil companies' pro¯ts: Not exactly what they seem to be", The Economist, October 30th 2004, pp.
71-72.
1valuable is investment technology innovation research that will achieve a softening of the
irreversible cost before the project's irreversible demise? This is a fresh question in the
real-options-based technology innovation literature. The existing literature has been con-
sidering the cost and the process of technology innovation as exogenous and independent
from the value of the project to which the ¯rm intends to apply the technical innova-
tion. Examples are Grenadier and Weiss (1996) under monopoly and Farzin, Huisman,
and Kort (1998) under perfect competition. Given a ¯rm with the monopoly over the
project, we provide a parsimonious answer to the question via an original use of barrier
contingent claims analysis: the upper bound on the fair current expense in cost-softening
innovation is the di®erence between the value of a demise-adjusted option to invest with
a cost-softening barrier and the value of the plain demise-adjusted option to invest. Con-
sider a ¯rm that holds the rights on a project. Entering the project implies a status-quo
irreversible cost of $10 million. The project has a PV of $10 million (the discount rate is
4%, the operating cash°ows are 4% per PV unit, and the PV volatility is 20%). Given
that the project will be discarded for good if its PV drops to $5 million (the demise
threshold), optimal delay of exercising the option to invest at the status-quo cost implies
a Total Net PV of $2.2235 million, which is the plain demise-adjusted option value. The
¯rm is keen on funding a technology-innovation task force with the target of making the
irreversible cost 50% cheaper than its status-quo level by the time the project's PV drops
below $6.5 million, that is, before the PV is corroded down to the demise threshold. How
much funding should be allocated if the ¯rm wants the target to be successfully achieved?
We show that, given the e®ectiveness demanded from technology innovation and given
2the project's characteristics, the ¯rm's expenditures in the required technology innovation
should be no more than $0.8512 million. Since a successful technology innovation implies
a 50% softening of the irreversible cost at the $6.5 million barrier, the $2.53809 million
¯gure is the di®erence between the value of a demise-adjusted option to invest with a
$6.5-million barrier that triggers cost softening and the value of the plain demise-adjusted
option to invest. Following Sbuelz (2004a and 2004b), our analysis is carried out with a
double barrier contingent claims technique2 to handle the free upper boundary for imme-
diate investment as well as the lower barrier at which cost softening is achieved-the demise
threshold constitutes an additional barrier that lies further below.
The work is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the investment problem with
irreversible demise. Section 3 looks at the dynamic programming formulation of the in-
vestment problem with irreversible demise under potential softening of the irreversible
cost. Section 4 solves the problem by double barrier contingent claims analysis. Sec-
tion 5 discusses the characteristics of the ¯rm's maximal expenditure in the cost-softening
technology innovation. Section 6 concludes.
2 Investment and demise
For a project with PV V , Ha-Duong and Morel (2003) consider the following problem: At
what critical level V ¤ of the project's value is it optimal to pay the status-quo irreversible
cost I in return for the project's value itself, given that the project will be discarded for
good whenever V drops to the irreversible-demise threshold? Such a threshold returns
2Sbuelz (2004a and 2004b) studies the real options e®ects of lower-barrier triggers in the absence of
demise irreversibility.
3a su±ciently negative Net PV to trigger the project's demise. We assume the demise
threshold to be a percentage · (· 2 [0;1]) of the current irreversible cost to enter the
project:
Demise threshold = ·I (without cost softening).
The stochastic changes in V are assumed to be spanned by existing traded assets of
the economy. The spanning assumption will make the analysis akin to the treatment of
perpetual American options. However, the entire analysis of the present work is valid even
if the spanning assumption is removed: One must only replace the riskfree rate r with
an appropriate discount rate3 and conceive the analysis under the physical probability
measure. V evolves according to the following geometric Brownian motion (under the
equivalent martingale measure):
dV = (r ¡ ±)V dt + ¾V dz;
where r is the riskfree rate, ± is the payout rate, ¾ is the volatility rate, and dz is the
increment of a Wiener process. The value of the demise-adjusted option to invest at the
status-quo cost I is F (V ). It is the opportunity cost of investing now rather than waiting
in the presence of the demise threshold. Ha-Duong and Morel (2003) use di®erential
3Dixit and Pindyck (1994) denote such a discount rate with the parameter ½.
4equations techniques to show that
F (V ) =
(V )¯1(·I)¯2 ¡ (V )¯2(·I)¯1
(V ¤)¯1(·I)¯2 ¡ (V ¤)¯2(·I)¯1 (V ¤ ¡ I)1fV ·V ¤g































We employ a double barrier contingent claims analysis of the Ha-Duong and Morel (2003)
solution. Indeed, given the double barrier nature of the problems at hand, solution tech-
niques based on double barrier contingent claims will prove to be neat and e®ective.
E [¢ j V ] is the conditional expectation given the project's PV V . Ta denotes V 's stopping
time at the real non-negative number a and 1fAg is the indicator function of the event
A. E
£
e¡rTV ¤1fTV ¤<T·Ig j V
¤
is the value of a perpetual double barrier cash-at-hit claim
written on the project's value: One unit of numeraire is paid as soon as the project's value
hits the upper barrier V ¤ provided that the lower barrier ·I is not reached ¯rst. Given the
geometric Brownian motion assumption, it is well known that (see, for example, Geman
and Yor (1996) and Sbuelz (2004c))
E
£
e¡rTV ¤1fTV ¤<T·Ig j V
¤
=
(V )¯1(·I)¯2 ¡ (V )¯2(·I)¯1
(V ¤)¯1(·I)¯2 ¡ (V ¤)¯2(·I)¯1 ;
which implies
F (V ) = E
£
e¡rTV ¤1fTV ¤<T·Ig j V
¤
(V ¤ ¡ I)1fV ·V ¤g
+(V ¡ I)1fV ¤<V g:
Since the project's value is spanned, the value of claims written on it is also spanned
and it must have no-arbitrage dynamics. Hence, the construction of F (V ) is such that
5F (V ) satis¯es the Black-Scholes di®erential equation in the continuation region, the Value
Matching Condition at the free upper boundary V ¤,
F (V ¤) = V ¤ ¡ I;
and the Demise Condition at the lower boundary ·I,
F (·I) = 0:




FjV =V ¤ =
d
dV
(V ¡ I)jV =V ¤ = 1:
2.1 Investment and demise after cost softening
Irreversible-cost softening implies a cost saving of (1 ¡ !)I, ! 2 (0;1). Once it is achieved,
the demise threshold shifts down:
Demise threshold = ·!I (after cost softening).
The value of the demise-adjusted option to invest at the novel irreversible cost !I is
Fsoft (V ). Its expression is
Fsoft (V ) = E
h
e¡rTV ¤1fTV ¤<T·!Ig j V
i
(V ¤ ¡ !I)1fV ·V ¤g + (V ¡ !I)1fV ¤<Vg:
The critical value V ¤ is the solution of the restriction from the Smooth Pasting Condition:
d
dV
FsoftjV =V ¤ =
d
dV
(V ¡ !I)jV =V ¤ = 1:
63 The dynamic programming problem
The chance of softening the irreversible cost via technology innovation changes the value
of the demise-adjusted option to invest. I denote the changed option value with J (V ).
Technology innovation is required to be successfully ignited by the time V drops to L,
the cost-softening barrier. At that PV level, entering the project becomes cheaper-the
irreversible cost of it is cut down to !I. Technology innovation is required to be business-
time e®ective, that is, to take e®ect before demise. Hence, the cost-softening barrier is a
lower barrier that is stricly above the current demise threshold:
L > ·I:
The Bellman equation for J (V ) is
J (V ) = maxf maxfV ¡ I;0g ; exp(¡rdt)E [J (V ) + dJ j V ] g;
with conditions,
J (V ¤¤) = V ¤¤ ¡ I (Value Matching Condition),
d
dV JjV =V ¤¤ = d
dV (V ¡ I)jV =V ¤¤ = 1 (Smooth Pasting Condition),
J (L) = Fsoft (L) (Cost Softening Condition),
where V ¤¤ is the critical value at which it is optimal for the ¯rm to access the project by
paying the status-quo irreversible cost I.
74 The double barrier contingent claims solution
In the region fV : V 2 [L;V ¤¤)g there is no immediate investment. Thus, the Bellman
equation boils down to the Black-Scholes di®erential equation:
E [dJ j V ] = J (V ) ¢ r ¢ dt:
The value of any spanned contingent claim satis¯es the Black-Scholes di®erential equa-
tion: In risk-adjusted expectation, the percentage increase in the spanned claim value
must equal the claim's percentage cost of carry. Since the operator E [d ² j V ] is linear,
any linear combination of spanned contingent claim values does satisfy the Black-Scholes
di®erential equation. The boundary conditions introduce a new double barrier corridor,
whose extrema are the free upper boundary V ¤¤ and the lower boundary L. Thus, the
candidate solution must be made of a linear combination of the values of two perpetual
double barrier cash-at-hit claims. The values of the two relevant claims are:
E
£

























¯2 ¡ (V ¤¤)
¯2 (L)
¯1 :
8The solution J (V ),
J (V ) = E
£
e¡rTV ¤¤1fTV ¤¤<TLg j V
¤
(V ¤¤ ¡ I)
+E
£
e¡rTV ¤¤1fTL<TV ¤¤g j V
¤
Fsoft (L)
satis¯es by construction the Black-Scholes di®erential equation, the Value Matching Con-
dition at the free upper boundary V ¤¤, and the Cost Softening Condition at the lower
boundary L. J (V ) must also ful¯ll the Smooth Pasting Condition, which generates a
restriction that pins down the critical value V ¤¤:
d
dV
JjV =V ¤¤ =
d
dV
(V ¡ I)jV =V ¤¤ = 1:
The upper bound on the fair current expense in technology innovation research that will
achieve the softening of the irreversible cost in the presence of irreversible demise is
J (V ) ¡ F (V );
that is, the value di®erence between an L-barrier demise-adjusted option to invest and a
plain demise-adjusted option to invest.
5 Value characteristics of cost softening with demise
In picking the parameter values, I rely on the classic real options calibration in Dixit
and Pindyck (1994), p. 153. Unless otherwise noted, I set the status-quo cost of the
investment, I, equal to 1, r = 4%, ± = 4%, and ¾ = 20% (at annual rates). All the
9¯gures4 (Figures 1-5) plot the project's Total Net PVs F (V ), J (V ), and Fsoft (V ) against
the project's value V . Figure 1 shows that technology innovation must come along with
a percentage cost saving 1 ¡ ! that is sizeable enough (25% is perhaps a good starting
point) before the di®erence J (V ) ¡ F (V ) can reach a level of notice. In Figure 1, the
ratio of the cost-softening barrier L to the investment I is set at 65% and the ratio of the
demise threshold to I is set at · = 50%. In Figure 2, L=I is set at 75%, the percentage
cost saving 1¡! is set at 50%, and the ratio · takes four di®erent values, from 70% to 0%.
As the ratio · decreases, demise looms less large and the upper bound on the fair current
expense to soften the irreversible cost decreases but does not vanish: Even with a zero
chance of the project's demise event, cost softening remains valuable. In Figures 3-5, L=I
is set at 75%, the ratio · is set at 50%, and the percentage cost saving 1¡! is set at 75%
to better visualize the value e®ects. Figure 3 shows that an increasing riskfree rate greatly
shrinks the di®erence J (V )¡F (V ), because V 's rising drift in°ates the call option value
F (V ) even in the proximity of the demise threshold ·I = 50%. Demise and drift-driven
in°ation of option values imply that the option values exhibit an initial concavity. They
regain their usual convex pattern for higher PVs. Figure 4 shows that an increasing payout
rate strongly boosts the di®erence J (V )¡F (V ) in the region [L;L + (1 ¡ !)I], because
V 's declining drift de°ates the option value F (V ) but in°ates the probability of hitting
the cost-softening barrier L. The project looks much unappealing under the status quo,
but cost-softening innovation that is predictably quick in coming along restitutes glamour
to the project. For ± ! 1, the project's PV tends to fall at an extraordinary speed and,
4The ¯gures are based on Mathematica software calculations. Critical values are determined by built-in
numerical routines (the maximum number of iterations is set at 200).
10when V is above L + (1 ¡ !)I, the option values J (V ) and F (V ) coincide:
J (V ) = F (V ) = maxfV ¡ I;0g = V ¡ I > [L + (1 ¡ !)I] ¡ I = L ¡ !I;
that is, immediate investment pays more than the value of waiting to invest. Figure 5
shows that, as usual, more risk (an high ¾) in°ates the value of any option. No local
value concavity arises because option value in°ation comes about by means of current-
value propagation of a riskier convex payo®. Hence, the upper bound on the fair current
expense to soften the irreversible cost remains non-trivial for a wide range of the project's
PV.
6 Conclusions
For a ¯rm with the monopoly over a project that has a PV subject to uncertainty and
that necessitates an irreversible investment to be entered, we study the maximum amount
the ¯rm is willing to spend up front in technology innovation to soften the irreversible
investment cost-cost softening is sought in deteriorating business conditions to undo the
negative value e®ects of the project's approaching demise. Demise is associated with a
given lower PV barrier that triggers irreversible discarding of the project. This is a novel
question in the real-options-based technology innovation literature and we answer it by
means of a novel application of double barrier contingent claims analysis. The upper
bound on the fair current expense to soften the irreversible cost is positive in a wide range
of the project's PV when PV volatility is high. When the project enjoys a high payout
rate or when the riskfree rate moves downward to zero, the upper bound is positive and
sizeable in a selected area of PVs - those values that are above the cost-softening barrier
11and imply small investment-option values under the status-quo investment technology. An
interesting extension of our analysis can come from removing the monopoly assumption
that is behind the exogeneity of the cost softening barrier and of the demise barrier.
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Figure 1: The investment-option values: The e®ect of the ratio ! of the soft-
ened cost to the status-quo cost
The values Fsoft (V ) (upper dashed line), J (V ) (bold solid line), F (V ) (lower dashed
line), and maxfV ¡ I;0g (dotted line) are plotted against the project's value V . The
parameter values are r = 4%, ± = 4%, and ¾ = 20%. The status-quo cost is I = 1, the
cost-softening barrier is L = 65%, and the demise threshold is ·I = 50%.
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Figure 2: The investment-option values: The e®ect of the ratio · of the demise
threshold to the status-quo cost
The values Fsoft (V ) (upper dashed line), J (V ) (bold solid line), F (V ) (lower dashed line),
and maxfV ¡ I;0g (dotted line) are plotted against the project's value V . The parameter
values are r = 4%, ± = 4%, and ¾ = 20%. The status-quo cost is I = 1, the cost-softening
barrier is L = 75%, and the ratio of the softened cost to the status-quo cost is ! = 50%.
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Figure 3: The investment-option values: The e®ect of the riskfree rate r
The values Fsoft (V ) (upper dashed line), J (V ) (bold solid line), F (V ) (lower dashed line),
and maxfV ¡ I;0g (dotted line) are plotted against the project's value V . The parameter
values are ± = 4% and ¾ = 20%. The status-quo cost is I = 1, the cost-softening barrier
is L = 75%, the demise threshold is ·I = 50%, and the ratio of the softened cost to the
status-quo cost is ! = 25%.
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Figure 4: The investment-option values: The e®ect of the payout rate ±
The values Fsoft (V ) (upper dashed line), J (V ) (bold solid line), F (V ) (lower dashed line),
and maxfV ¡ I;0g (dotted line) are plotted against the project's value V . The parameter
values are r = 4% and ¾ = 20%. The status-quo cost is I = 1, the cost-softening barrier
is L = 75%, the demise threshold is ·I = 50%, and the ratio of the softened cost to the
status-quo cost is ! = 25%.





















V   50%





















V   30%





















V   20%





















V   5%
Figure 5: The investment-option values: The e®ect of the volatility rate ¾
The values Fsoft (V ) (upper dashed line), J (V ) (bold solid line), F (V ) (lower dashed line),
and maxfV ¡ I;0g (dotted line) are plotted against the project's value V . The parameter
values are r = 4% and ± = 4%. The status-quo cost is I = 1, the cost-softening barrier
is L = 75%, the demise threshold is ·I = 50%, and the ratio of the softened cost to the
status-quo cost is ! = 25%.
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